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Abstract
An important source of conflict surrounding nuclear energy is that with a very small probability, a large-scale
nuclear accident may occur. One way to internalize the associated financial risks is through mandating nuclear
operators to have liability insurance. This paper presents estimates of consumers’ willingness to pay for increased
financial security provided by an extension of coverage, based on the ‘stated choice’ approach. A Swiss citizen with
median characteristics may be willing to pay 0.14 US cents per kwh to increase coverage beyond the current CHF
0.7 billion (bn.) (US$ 0.47 bn.). Marginal willingness to pay declines with higher coverage but exceeds marginal
cost at least up to CHF 4 bn. (US$ 2.7 bn.). An extension of nuclear liability insurance coverage therefore may be
efficiency-enhancing.
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Nuclear power plants provoke conflicts in many countries. While many voters and politicians
are committed on this issue, others will gauge the advantages and disadvantages of the
nuclear option. On the downside, an important consideration is that with a very small
probability, an accident causing billions of Dollars of damage may occur.
This paper seeks to estimate the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of Swiss citizens for relief
from the financial consequences of a severe nuclear accident, to be provided by an extension
of liability insurance coverage mandated to nuclear power operators. This statement of
objective calls for two clarifications. First, the risk to be considered needs to be defined.
In the production process of nuclear energy, at least ten stages can be identified, each with
its proper risks (Hirschberg, Spiekerman, and Dones, 1998). This paper deals exclusively
with the risks of nuclear energy produced in Switzerland. Second, it focuses on mandatory
liability insurance as an instrument for risk internalization. The many norms that govern the
production of nuclear power, monitored by the Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK),
are simply taken as given.
This regulation in combination with the legal norm of liability still leaves room for what
Shavell (1986) calls the judgement proof problem. The judgement proof problem consists
of the possibility that nuclear power plant operators may fail to pay compensation for the
damage caused, due to lack of assets. As shown by Shavell, mandatory liability insurance
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serves to avoid this shortcoming. This finding justifies considering mandatory liability
insurance as an instrument of nuclear risk internalization.
In Switzerland, the current coverage of CHF 0.7 billion (bn.) (approx. US$ 0.47 bn. at
2002 exchange rates) written by private insurers will hardly be sufficient to compensate the
victims of an accident. However, an extension of coverage will result in a higher outlay for
nuclear power. No market for individually contracted supplementary coverage has devel-
oped, quite likely because there are no contractual relationships between nuclear insurers
and consumers to build upon. Therefore, determining the importance accorded to more
comprehensive relief from the financial consequences of a severe nuclear accident amounts
to estimating the increase in the price of electricity that would be accepted by consumers
in return for extended liability coverage to be bought by plant operators.
‘Stated choice’ rather than conventional ‘contingent valuation’ experiments were con-
ducted to measure WTP. In ‘stated choice’, different attributes of electric power are distin-
guished and varied from one scenario to the next. This should avoid fixation on the price
attribute which in ‘contingent valuation’ may cause respondents to forget about alternate
uses of their income, thus resulting in excessive estimates of WTP. Moreover, respondents
are not asked to provide rankings but only to choose between the status quo and one alter-
native at a time, which serves to bring the experimental situation close to everyday decision
making.
The basic hypothesis is that opting for the alternative must entail a utility gain that can
be related to the levels of the attributes pertaining to the scenario. Therefore, the utility
associated with an attribute can be inferred from the observed choice sequences using a
discrete choice model. Since the surcharge per kwh is one of the attributes, it is possible to
calculate WTP values for the other attributes (in particular, extension of insurance coverage).
Indeed, respondents valued five attributes of power in a way that is consistent with eco-
nomic theory, and median estimated WTP amounts to a realistic 0.14 US cents per kwh.
Since quite probably the extra cost of a fivefold extension of present liability coverage is be-
low this figure, the benefits of such an extension exceed its cost, suggesting an improvement
of efficiency.
1. Determining willingness to pay through ‘stated choice’
For goods and services traded on markets, there is no need to measure willingness to pay. By
accepting a price the customer reveals that his WTP is at least as high as the price. The safety
of nuclear power plants is not yet traded on markets (though it is possible to think of nuke-
bonds which mature in case of a prespecified accident). Neither does individually contracted
insurance against nuclear risks exist which would reveal potential victims’ willingness to
pay for nuclear safety.
1.1. ‘Stated choice’ methodology
In the absence of opportunities to observe revealed preferences, it is necessary to measure
stated preferences through experiments. Earlier attempts to measure WTP for nonmarket
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goods used the contingent valuation variant of stated preference (see e.g. Mitchell, 1989;
Hausman, 1993). This methodology can also be applied to risk reduction (see e.g. Krupnick
et al., 2002).
In the present context, respondents would have to state the maximum amount per kwh
they would be prepared to pay for the increased financial security achieved by an extension
of mandatory liability insurance. The difficulty with this direct approach is that in real life
people hardly ever ask themselves such questions. Rather, they compare the attributes of a
good and its price and then decide to buy it or not.
The ‘stated choice’ approach, developed by Louviere and Hensher (1982), seeks to sim-
ulate this everyday decision making. Rather than directly asking for willingness to pay, it
seeks to elicit it indirectly through ‘accept’/‘reject’ choices. Its basic assumption is that
individuals derive utility from the attributes of products and are willing to trade them off
against each other (Lancaster, 1966). The first application of stated choice to risk reduction
seems to be Telser and Zweifel (2002), which extends the paired comparison approach used
in Magat, Viscusi, and Huber (1988) to a framework of multiple product attributes and
ordinal utility.
In the present context, the ‘stated choice’ method allows individuals to choose among
different types of electricity. During the decision process, the attributes (among them price)
of electricity are traded off against each other. By observing several similar decisions it is
possible to estimate how much income (through higher electricity prices) respondents are
ready to give up in return for an increased amount of some other desired attribute.
One particular tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 1. Utility increases with insurance coverage
in the event of an accident (as a percentage of maximum possible loss) and decreases with
Figure 1. Trading off different product attributes.
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the average number of power blackouts; both attributes were found to be relevant to the
persons interviewed (see Section 2). Assume that the status quo is given by combination A
(1% insurance coverage, 2 blackouts/year). Point B indicates that the individual is willing
to accept a slightly higher number of blackouts if insurance coverage is raised to 2%. The
corresponding sacrifice in terms of security of supply is the marginal WTP for an increased
insurance coverage.
Now participants in the experiment are asked to evaluate additional combinations, for
example point C. If C is accepted, then the individual’s indifference curve must lie above
C. Next, it must lie below point D if D is rejected. Proceeding in this manner, it is possible
to approximate the indifference curve. Finally, the marginal willingness to pay measured
in money terms (MWP) can be estimated in the same way, by introducing the increase in
the price of electricity as an additional product attribute. The corresponding increase in
the outlay on electricity is a sacrifice of income which would otherwise be available for
spending on other goods.
Summing up, using ‘stated choice’ the experimenter is not limited to varying only price
and insurance coverage but can introduce other attributes that influence real life decisions
concerning electricity. Failing this, he runs the risk of causing respondents to associate with
variations in price or insurance coverage attributes not explicitly included in the experiment
(and therefore assumed as fixed).
1.2. Problems with risk assessment
The ultimate objective of this work is to provide guidance to public regulation. For this
purpose it would be preferable to have experiments based on objective probabilities. How-
ever, in the present context objective probabilities are not available since experts differ in
their estimates of the probability of a catastrophic nuclear accident (Zweifel and Umbricht,
2002). In this situation, respondents’ own subjective estimates become crucially important.
Specifically the additional ambiguity caused may affect respondents’ level of expected util-
ity as well as their tradeoffs between attributes such as the one shown in Figure 1 (Viscusi,
1998, ch. 2).
Ganderton et al. (2000) provide a possible solution to the problem of ambiguity. They
conduct laboratory experiments where subjects had to decide about insurance against a
low probability—high consequence event. Several draws from a loss function known to
participants were revealed to subjects, who made choices largely consistent with predictions
of the expected utility theory. However, the loss function cannot be claimed to be known in
the present context.
Another problem is low probabilities. Here, Kunreuther, Novemsky, and Kahneman
(2001) found that supplying a reference point in terms of a more probable and familiar
risk and providing a good deal of contextual information helped respondents in dealing
with low probabilities. In the present study, experts’ average estimated probability of the
highest possible loss served as the reference point. However, respondents were not asked
to adopt this value, but to indicate their own probability estimate relative to that of the
experts. The required contextual information comes from two sources, viz. the introduction
to the experiment (see Appendix 5.1) and the remaining attributes characterizing types of
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Figure 2. Beliefs about loss probabilities relative to experts’ estimates. X -axis shows probability deviations in
powers of 10 (see Appendix 5.2).
power, which moreover are allowed to vary during the ‘stated choice’ experiment. In sum,
this setup serves to reduce the complexity of the choice situations by only incorporating
the loss dimension of risk, while still allowing the effect of different beliefs about the loss
probabilities to be estimated.
Figure 2 shows the frequencies of deviations from the reference point (the scale used to
elicit this information can be found in Appendix 5.2). More pessimistic beliefs clearly out-
weigh optimistic deviations, in keeping with findings reported by Camerer and Kunreuther
(1989).
2. Experimental design
In the context of a ‘stated choice’ experiment several issues must be addressed. What product
attributes are to be included? How many levels should be distinguished in an attribute? How
should the level of attributes vary between choice scenarios? How many choice scenarios
should be presented to each respondent? An extensive literature is devoted to these and other
issues (see e.g. Louviere, Hensher, and Swait (2000) and Hedayat, Sloane, and Stufken
(1999)).
2.1. Determination of attributes and their levels
First of all, the relevant attributes of electric power need to be identified. Their number
must be kept low for the decision problem to remain manageable. In a separate survey, ap-
proximately 500 persons were asked in spring 2001 to rate 15 different attributes, assigning
them ranks between 1 (not important) and 10 (very important). Among the most important
were: secure and sustainable waste disposal (9.26), size of area exposed to hazard (8.91),
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Table 1. Levels of attributes.
Attribute Levels (Codingc) Unit Status quo
Price 0; 10; 30; 60 (0;. . . ;60) percent 0
Blackouts 2; 14 (0;1) numb./year 2
Waste unresolved problems (1); unresolved
no unresolved problems (0) problems
Damagea 0.1; 10; 100; 200 (0.1;. . . ;200) CHF bn. 200
Coverageb 1; 20; 50; 100 (1;. . . ;100) percent 1
aValues in US$ bn: 0.065; 6.5; 65; 130 (at 2002 exchange rates).
bCoverage in percent of loss.
cBold for status quo.
reliability (low frequency of blackouts) (8.68), financial compensation of the victims in case
of an accident (8.78), and average price per kwh (7.69).
Next, levels have to be assigned to attributes. Again they must be few in number in order
to avoid long interviews. But then, the levels must reach sufficiently extreme values to cause
respondents to switch from “accept” to “reject” and vice versa.
To test the questionnaire, six persons were interviewed in a first pretest. Without ex-
ception they understood the questions and were able to process the choice scenarios
without problems. However, the attribute ‘insurance coverage’ was regarded as relatively
unimportant.
A second pretest comprising 20 persons was conducted, with the maximum price hike
boosted to 60 percent in order to induce a sufficient frequency of rejected scenarios (com-
pared to the status quo). The most important attribute was again safe waste disposal, this
time followed by insurance coverage and price.
For the final survey the five product attributes ‘price’, ‘blackout’, ‘waste disposal’, ‘dam-
age’ and ‘insurance coverage’ were used. Table 1 gives an overview and the next section
describes the attributes in detail.
2.2. Description of attributes
Price. The attribute ‘Price’ is the percentage increase caused by the extension of liability
insurance coverage over the status quo. It read, e.g., “30 percent more expensive than at
present (this is equivalent to a surcharge of CHF 285 on an annual electricity bill of CHF
950)”. To obtain an absolute value for willingness to pay (WTP), this value was later
multiplied by the actual annual electricity bill as indicated by respondents. Throughout the
analysis it was assumed that respondents do not change the quantity of energy consumed.
With this assumption, the higher price can be translated into a higher total outlay for
electricity, and hence a lower disposable income which thus becomes a product attribute in
the econometric analysis (see Section 3.2).
Blackout. The attribute ‘Blackout’ indicates if the scenario considered has a high incidence
of blackouts (14 per year, coded 1) or a low incidence (2 per year, coded 0). It is a proxy
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of service reliability. The scenario description read, “. . . In Switzerland, blackouts are rare
and mainly caused by environmental effects (storms) or maintenance work. . . ”
Waste. Since ‘Waste’ was an important attribute in both pretests, it had to be included in
the final experiment. This variable takes on two values: Either there are unresolved problems
with waste disposal (=1), or there are no unresolved problems with waste disposal (=0).
‘Waste’ was described as follows, “. . . Disposal of waste occasions problems and risks of
variable magnitude. This holds in particular for nuclear waste, where these problems are
not resolved yet.”
Damage. This indicates that electricity generation may cause a (hypothetical) maximum
loss amounting to e.g. CHF 100 bn. (appr. US$ 65 bn.) in the event of an accident. In order
to make this amount more comprehensible, it was also expressed as an average damage
per household. The attribute description said, “. . . All types of generating facility can cause
accidents. Large scale accidents are rare. The magnitude of an accident cannot be calculated
with precision but strongly depends on the type of facility.”
Coverage. This indicates the part of maximum loss which would be covered by liability
insurance. The text said, e.g., “one percent of the financial damage is insured”. See Figure 3
for an example.
Note that the probability of an accident is not among the product attributes, as explained
in Section 1.2.
Figure 3 shows one of the choice scenarios. Type A power is always associated with the
status quo scenario to simplify decision making. Type B power has the same five attributes
as type A, but with levels changed with regard to four of them. Thus, by simply deciding
between types A and B, respondents implicitly trade off attributes. Since this choice is
repeated several times with varying attribute levels for type B, these tradeoffs become
estimable.
2.3. Scenario selection
The design summarized in Table 1 gives rise to 256 possible scenarios.1 Obviously this is an
excessive number for the questionnaire, calling for a reduced design. This was constructed
using ‘Gosset’, a general purpose program for designing experiments (Hardin and Sloane,
1993) (see Appendix 5.3 for the program code). ‘Gosset’ selects the vectors of a regressor
matrix X in a way as to minimize or maximize a function of the covariance matrix of the
parameters to be estimated, viz. (X ′ X )−1 in the case of OLS. The D-optimality criterion
which was used in the present experiment, maximizes the determinant of the Fisher infor-
mation matrix. While ‘Gosset’ solves this maximization problem for linear models (such as
OLS) only, it is a reasonable approximation for nonlinear models such as probit (Kanninen,
2002). The reduced design was chosen to enable estimation of all quadratic as well as all
interaction terms between product attributes. In this way, the number of scenarios to be
included in the survey was reduced to 42.
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Figure 3. Example of a choice scenario.
Since it is not possible for a respondent to evaluate all 42 scenarios, 14 scenarios were
chosen at random. This resulted in a unique ‘stated choice’ questionnaire for each person
interviewed.
2.4. Design of the questionnaire
The questionnaire was divided into four parts. The first part consisted of some general
warm-up questions concerning energy use. In addition the yearly electricity outlay of the
respondent was asked for.
The second part contained information about the consequences of severe accidents in
power production, focusing on nuclear and hydro (see Appendix 5.1 for details). In Switzer-
land fossil fuels are negligible in electricity generation. In addition, the limited coverage
of current nuclear liability insurance was evoked. Two solutions to this problem were
sketched. First, the government could raise tax to compensate victims in the event of an
accident. Second, mandated insurance coverage could be extended, which however would
result in higher electricity prices. For more details (in German), see http://www.soi.unizh.ch/
staff/schneider/index2.html. Respondents were asked to state their subjective probability of
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a severe accident relative to that of experts (see Appendix 5.2). Finally the attributes used
in the stated choice part of the questionnaire were explained (see Section 2.2 above).
The third part contained the scenarios for the ‘stated choice’ experiment.
In the fourth part, socioeconomic data and information concerning the understanding of
the ‘stated choice’ experiment were collected. Some 20 percent of respondents reported
difficulties with the questionnaire. Roughly 73 percent stated they considered one of the
attributes to be of overriding importance, which could be interpreted as an indication of
lexicographic preferences. However, the econometric analysis failed to produce evidence
suggesting that these individuals traded off attributes less frequently or less consistently.
3. Econometric analysis
3.1. Data
Face to face interviews were performed in the German speaking part of Switzerland during
September and October 2001. In total, 391 persons were interviewed. Average income of
respondents is CHF 42,000 (US$ 28,000) having a yearly outlay on electricity of CHF
940 (US$ 630). 80 percent had a medium level of education (either vocational school,
community college, technical college or equivalent education) and the average age was 42.
Moreover, the sample was designed to have an equal proportion of men and women.
With 391 persons each evaluating 14 (out of a total of 42) choice scenarios, a total of 5,474
decisions were recorded. Respondents who felt unable to decide could always choose the
option “not able to decide”. This served to prevent choices made at random by individuals
who in fact were indifferent or unable to decide.
In 819 cases (15 percent), no choice was stated, resulting in 4,655 usable observations.
Only 90 percent of these (4,154) were used for estimation, while 10 percent were put
aside for an out-of-sample test (Section 3.5). In 27 percent of choices, the status quo was
preferred. Missing values for socioeconomic information resulted in a final reduction to
4,119 observations.
3.2. Theoretical background and specification
No attempt was made to anchor specification in expected utility theory. Instead a general
utility function in the retained attributes with linear, quadratic and mixed terms is used. To
allow for heterogeneous preferences, socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents are
interacted with income net of electricity outlay (i.e. disposable income), in accordance with
Johnson and Desvousges (1997). This leads to the following utility function for individual
i and power type j :
Ui j = αX j + β1wi j + β2w2i j + γ1ziwi j + γ2ziw2i j , (1)
where X j includes all linear, quadratic and mixed terms of electricity attributes, except
disposable income wi j . Disposable income is given by wi j := (mi − outlayi j ) with mi for
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income and outlayi j for total outlay on electricity, zi denotes the vector of socioeconomic
variables, and α, β1, β2, γ1, γ2 are to be estimated.
According to the random utility model (McFadden, 2001), the respondent evaluates the
utility of the two scenarios and chooses the one with the higher utility. If ‘A’ denotes the
attribute values of the status quo scenario, then individual i chooses the alternative (B) of
choice set j if UiB j > UiA j , i.e. if
α
(
X B j − X A j
) + β1(1 − di )(wiB j − wiA j ) + β2(1 − di )(w2iB j − w2iA j )
+ γ1zi (1 − di )
(
wiB j − wiA j
) + γ2(1 − di )zi(w2iB j − w2iA j ) (2)+ δ1di(wiB j − wiA j ) + δ2zi di(wiB j − wiA j )
+ δ3di
(
w2iB j − w2iA j
) + δ4di zi(w2iB j − w2iA j ) + ηi + i j > 0.
In addition to Eq. (1), Eq. (2) contains a dummy variable di to reflect the fact that income
is missing with 43 percent of all individuals. It takes on the value of zero if income was
revealed and one if missing, in which case the difference in disposable income reduces to
the (inverse) difference of electricity outlay.
The error term appearing in this comparision has an individual-specific (ηi ) and a general
component (i j ) that also varies with the choice set presented. The two components are
assumed to conform to the usual random effects specification (Greene, 1997, ch. 14), with
ρ = var(ηi )/var(ηi + i j ).
The dependent variable yi j (choice of power type B) is given by
yi j =
{1 if inequality (2) holds
0 otherwise.
(3)
From this expression it becomes clear that the variables used in estimation are the differences
between the attribute levels of scenario B and scenario A. For instance damage is defined as
the maximum level of loss in scenario B minus the maximum level of loss in scenario A. For
example, an individual opting for type B power in decision no. 4209 of Figure 3 and having
revealed his or her income has the following observation vector, in keeping with Table 1:
(y; blackout; waste; damage; coverage; . . .; blackout2; waste2; damage2; coverage2; . . .)
= (1; 0–0; 0–1; 0.1–200; 100–1; . . .; 02–02; 02–12; 0.12–2002; 1002–12; . . .). Personal
characteristics, which do not change between scenarios, drop out of the regression unless
they interact with electricity attributes.
3.3. Explanatory variables
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for some of the variables used. The product attributes
were already explained in Section 2. Note that outlay on electricity rather than price was used
as an explanatory variable. In this way, an increase in outlay (occasioned by a higher price)
can be interpreted as a reduction of disposable income. Of course, this holds only if outlay
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for variables used in estimation.
Mean Median Unit
blackoutsa 0.48 0 Dummy
wastea −0.49 0 Dummy
damagea −128 −190 CHF bn.
Coveragea 43 49 percent
Disposable incomea −152 0 CHF
Damage2 b −28,175 −39,900 CHF bn.
Coverage2 b 3,360 2,500 percent
Outlay on electricity 940 840 CHF
Income (if revealed) 41,890 36,000 CHF/year
Income not revealed 0.43 0 dummy
Age 43 42 years
Sex is female 0.51 1 dummy
Pessimistic beliefs 0.72 1 dummy
Medium level of educationc 0.82 1 dummy
High level of education 0.08 0 dummy
aDenotes difference between status quo (A) nd alternatives (B j ), see Section 3.2.
bDifference of squared values, e.g. damage2 = damage2B − damage2A .
cVocational school, community college, technical college.
and price move in fixed proportions, i.e. if the quantity of power consumed stays constant.
Since price elasticities of the household demand for electricity are low in Switzerland
(Bonomo et al., 1998), this assumption is justifiable.
Product attributes appear in linear, quadratic, and mixed form. The dummy variables
for blackout and waste cannot be squared because of multicollinearity. In keeping with
Section 3.2, only the difference in the attributes between scenario B (the alternative sce-
nario) and scenario A (the status quo) are relevant for estimation. Therefore all product
attribute variables in Table 2 are differences between A and B, e.g. damage is defined
as damageB − damageA and damage2 as damage2B − damage2A (note that damage2 =
(damageB − damageA)2).
3.4. Estimation results
3.4.1. General findings. The model from Eq. (3) was estimated using a random-effects
probit specification. Estimation results for the utility function are displayed in Table 3 as
well as in Table 6 of Appendix 5.4.
The linear forms of four out of five product attributes have the expected sign; note that
(disposable) income has become a function of outlay and thus constitutes a product attribute.
While damage has an unexpected (but insignificant) positive coefficient, the negative sign
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Table 3. Estimation of utility function.
Variables (selection) Coefficient S.E.
Many blackouts (blackouts) −0.26656∗∗ 0.09293
Unresolved waste disposal problems (waste) −0.67369∗∗ 0.09702
Damage in 100 CHF bn. (damage) 0.06612 0.15924
Insurance coverage in percent (coverage) 0.01416∗∗ 0.00329
Disposable income in CHF 000s (income) 2.9755∗ 1.4302
Income2 0.0228 0.0142
Damage2 −0.2320∗∗ 0.0794
Coverage2 −0.00009∗∗ 0.00003
Damage∗coverage 0.0342∗∗ 0.0106
Coverage∗blackouts −0.00363∗ 0.00164
(Pessimistic beliefs)∗ income −1.0153 0.6523
(Medium level education)∗ income2 −0.0239+ 0.0136
(High level education)∗ income −6.7719∗∗ 1.6609
Age∗ income 0.0480∗ 0.0211
Age*income2 −0.0002+ 0.0001
Constant 0.22319+ 0.13173
For complete estimation results see Appendix 5.4
Observations 4119
Number of individuals 375
Log likelihood −1959.67
Log likelihood constant only −2326.77
ρ 0.5425
ση 1.0890
+Significant at 10%, ∗Significant at 5%, ∗∗Significant at 1%.
of damage2 changes the overall impact from positive to negative for a large subset of values
of explanatory variables.
Most importantly, the coefficients for coverage and income have both a positive and
significant effect on utility and hence choice probability. Finally, there is some indication of
respondents who hold a more pessimistic belief than experts with regard to the probability
of an accident having a lower marginal utility of income over a large range of income (see
the not quite significant coefficient of pessimistic beliefs*income). In keeping with Eq. (4)
below, this should result in a higher marginal willingness to pay for additional coverage.
The same holds for individuals with a high education level, however, the negative basis
effect evidenced in Table 3 is so strong that their WTP remains negative over the whole
range of coverage.
Finally, the goodness of fit, measured by a pseudo-R2 of 0.16, is satisfactory for a random-
effects specification. The significantly positive value of ρ = 0.54 shows that 54 percent of
the variance of the error term can be attributed to individual-specific effects.
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3.4.2. Calculation of MWP for financial security. The marginal willingness to pay (MWP)
for additional coverage is given by
MWP = ∂
ˆU/∂coverage
∂ ˆU/∂income
, (4)
with income defined as income net of outlay on electricity so that ∂ ˆU/∂income is the
estimated marginal utility of disposable income. The ratio between the marginal utility
of coverage and the marginal utility of income defines the MWP for additional financial
security through increased insurance coverage. In order to express the MWP in terms of US
cents per kwh, the quantity of power consumed must be known. This was calculated as the
annual outlay devided by the average price of electricity at the household level during the
year 1999 (16.2 Swiss cents/kwh, i.e. US 11 cents/kwh), obtaining
MWP[US cents/kWh] := MWP[US$/year] · 100
Outlay in US$/0.11 (5)
In order to get an impression of the MWP across the entire sample, the MWP for in-
creased coverage was calculated for each person based on his or her specific socioeconomic
characteristics and a power type which has few blackouts (blackouts = 0), unresolved
problems with waste disposal (waste = 1), a maximum possible loss of CHF 200 bn. (US$
130 bn.) and initial coverage amounting to a mere 1 percent (coverage = 1 percentage).
The resulting density function is shown in Figure 4.
For the calculation of this density function, only the subsample of individuals who stated
their income was used. Average MWP for this group amounts to 0.16 US cents/kwh, median
Figure 4. Density of MWP in US cents/kwh. damage = 200 (US$ 130 bn.), waste = 1, blackouts = 0 and
coverage = 1. (Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.66).
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Figure 5. MWP in US cents/kwh including 95 percent confidence intervals; 42 year old woman, medium level
education, pessimistic beliefs, income US$ 24,000, damage = 200 (US$ 130 bn.), waste = 1, blackouts = 0,
outlay = 840 (US$ 560).
MWP to 0.14 US cents/kwh. Compared to the average price of 11 cents paid in 1999, this
corresponds to 1.3 percent of the electricity price. This does not seem excessive a priori,
especially when taking the decline of MWP with increasing coverage into account (see
Figure 5).
In order to check whether these MWP values are significantly different from zero, standard
errors were calculated, using the delta-method although it may result in an underestimate
(see e.g. Polsky et al. (1997) and Telser (2002, ch. 4)). The alternatives would have been
the Filler method, which only works for a simple ratio of coefficients, and bootstrapping.
Figure 5 shows the MWP of a person with median characteristics (woman aged 44 with
medium level of education and pessimistic beliefs) along with its 95 percent confidence
intervals. Estimated MWP declines, becoming indistinguishable from zero near an initial
coverage rate of 95 percent. At a coverage level of 100 percent at the latest, MWP should the-
oretically be zero. However, this restriction was in no way built into the experiment. Figure
5 thus may be considered as providing preliminary evidence for the experiment’s validity.
3.4.3. Plausibility tests of estimated MWP. A first plausibility test derives from the influ-
ence of income on MWP. If financial security is a normal economic good, MWP should be
higher than average among individuals with high income. This prediction is borne out in
Figure 6. However, these differences lack statistical significance.
Second, due to the income effect, MWP should decline with increasing outlay on electric-
ity. This is indeed the case without exception in both Tables 4 and 5. Moreover, MWP again
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Figure 6. MWP in US cents/kwh of a 42 year old woman with medium level education, pessimistic beliefs and
outlay on electricity of CHF 840 (US$ 560) per year. Maximum loss is CHF 200 bn. (US$ 130 bn.). Incomes at
US$ 6,700; 24,000; 47,000; 93,000 respectively.
decreases with initial coverage for a given value of electricity outlay, confirming Figures 5
and 6.
Comparison of Tables 4 and 5 (with maximum loss doubled) shows that MWP increases
systematically with maximum possible loss. This too corresponds with theoretical consid-
erations if risk aversion is assumed (Chambers and Quiggin, 2000, ch.3).
Finally, under very general conditions, the MWP of a risk averse individual is predicted
to increase with increasing probability of an accident. Evaluation of the equation for MWP
Table 4. MWP in US cents/kwh of a 42 years old woman with medium level education, pessimistic beliefs
and an income of US$ 24,000. Maximum loss is CHF 100 bn. (US$ 65 bn.), waste = 1, blackouts = 0.
Coverage Electricity outlay (US$ per year)
(percent) 400 530 670 800 930 1070 1200
0 0.1306 0.0979 0.0783 0.0652 0.0559 0.0489 0.0434
20 0.1063 0.0797 0.0637 0.0531 0.0455 0.0398 0.0353
40 0.0820 0.0615 0.0491 0.0409 0.0351 0.0307 0.0273
60 0.0576 0.0432 0.0346 0.0288 0.0247 0.0216 0.0192
80 0.0333 0.0250 0.0200 0.0166 0.0142 0.0125 0.0111
100 0.0090 0.0067 0.0054 0.0045 0.0038 0.0034 0.0030
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Table 5. MWP in US cents/kwh of a 42 years old woman with medium level of education, pessimistic beliefs
and an income of US$ 24,000. Maximum loss is CHF 200 bn. (US$ 130 bn.), waste = 1, blackouts = 0.
Coverage Electricity outlay (US$ per year)
(percent) 400 530 670 800 930 1070 1200
0 0.1545 0.1158 0.0926 0.0771 0.0661 0.0578 0.0514
20 0.1301 0.0976 0.0780 0.0650 0.0557 0.0487 0.0433
40 0.1058 0.0793 0.0634 0.0528 0.0453 0.0396 0.0352
60 0.0815 0.0611 0.0488 0.0407 0.0349 0.0305 0.0271
80 0.0571 0.0428 0.0343 0.0285 0.0244 0.0214 0.0190
100 0.0328 0.0246 0.0197 0.0164 0.0140 0.0123 0.0109
with regard to all relevant levels of the attributes shows that the MWP of individuals with
pessimistic beliefs (probability of accident is higher than experts’ estimate) is indeed greater
than with beliefs congruent with experts’ estimate. This effect, however, is not significant.
3.5. Out-of-sample test
The two performance criteria of an empirical investigation are its reliability and valid-
ity (Singleton and Straits, 1999). Reliability refers to the stability and consistency of the
operational definition (here: MWP); validity refers to the goodness of fit between the
operational definition and the concept that it is supposed to measure (here: valuation of
nuclear risks).
Since effective choices cannot be observed and compared with the stated choices in the
experiment, it is not possible to check validity directly, i.e. whether estimated MWP for a
reduction of financial risk is a good proxi for the valuation of financial consequences of
nuclear risks.
However, there are studies suggesting that the ‘stated choice’ method leads to results
that are in line with corresponding hedonic price estimations (Gegax and Stanley, 1997;
Louviere, Meyer, and Bunch, 1999; Haener, Boxall, and Adamowicz, 2000). This suggests
validity.
As to reliability, an out-of-sample test can be performed on the 10 percent of observations
that were not used for estimation. The model predicts the probability of choosing the
alternate scenario. For a calculated probability of more than 50 percent, the individual is
assumed to choose the alternate scenario. It turns out that out of sample, roughly 70 percent
of all decisions were predicted correctly. This share has to be compared to the share of correct
decisions which would result from a random process. In the sample used for estimation, the
alternate scenario was chosen 63 percent of the time. Now, a random process that generates
choice of the alternate scenario in 63 percent of all cases and of the status quo scenario
in 27 percent would predict correctly in 47 percent of cases. This value is the sum of the
probability that the random process predicted the alternative and that the alternative was
actually chosen (0.632) plus the probability that it predicted the status quo and that the status
quo was actually chosen (0.272).
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The estimated utility model thus serves to increase the share of correct predictions by 23
percentage points (= 70–47) over a random process. This points to a measure of reliability.
4. Conclusions
Measurement of willingness to pay for an increased internalization of the risks emanating
from nuclear power plants is important for energy policy. One instrument of internalization
is extending coverage provided by mandatory liability insurance for plant operators. For
all its popular appeal, such a proposal will face opposition in parliament and by consumers
since higher insurance premiums lead to higher electricity prices.
This study seeks to determine how much Swiss citizens value increased financial security
through increased insurance coverage in case of an accident by using the economic concept
of marginal willingness to pay for (financial) security.
Since additional coverage is not available to individual consumers, a ‘stated choice’ ex-
periment was carried out, in which respondents decide in favor of or against an alternative
to the status quo, characterized by several attributes of electricity. These attributes are var-
ied throughout the experiment, in contradistinction to conventional ‘contingent valuation’
approaches. The relevant attributes were established by means of three pretests and turned
out to be electricity price, frequency of blackouts, waste disposal, maximum possible loss
in case of an accident, and insurance coverage. The econometric analysis confirms this
selection, since all attributes are estimated to be statistically significant arguments of the
underlying utility function. Average marginal willingness to pay for an additional percent-
age point of compensation for losses in excess of the status quo amounts to some 0.16 US
cents per kwh (median value 0.14 cents), approaching zero when insurance coverage goes
towards 100 percent.
Specifically, an increase of mandated liability insurance coverage from today’s CHF 0.7
bn. (US$ 0.47 bn.) to CHF 4 bn. (US$ 2.7 bn.) would command a WTP amounting to 0.40
US cents/kwh. This can be compared to an estimate of additional cost. In a companion
study, a log-logistic density function for nuclear damages (i.e. the loss function for nuclear
insurers) was calibrated. According to that study, an increase of liability insurance from
today’s CHF 0.7 bn. (US$ 0.47 bn.) to CHF 4 bn. (US$ 2.7 bn.) would result in an increase
in the price of electricity of 0.008 US cents/kwh (Zweifel and Umbricht, 2002, Table 4.16).
Therefore, quintuplicating current insurance coverage could lead to a welfare gain for the
majority of Swiss citizens.
This proposition has to be qualified in several ways. On the cost side, the choice of the
distribution law can be criticized. Indeed, a different choice (Gamma e.g.) would entail
somewhat changed marginal cost estimates. On the benefits side investigated here, one has
to accept the fact that no thought experiment can simulate the actual decision environment
completely. In particular there is no guarantee that participants take described damages
seriously and do not speculate on the government providing financial assistance to victims
in case of a major accident.2 On the other hand, estimated values of marginal willingness
to pay do exhibit theoretically plausible variations in several dimensions, thus providing a
measure of support for the validity of the experiment.
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5. Appendix
5.1. Contextual information provided for the interview
Figure 7. Contextual information provided for the interview.
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5.2. Risk estimate
Figure 8. Method used in the questionnaire to elicit the subjective risk estimates for nuclear and hydro accidents
respectively. The respondents had to mark their own risk estimate in one of the boxes.
5.3. Gosset code used to construct reduced design
The experimental design was constructed using the program ‘Gosset’ by Hardin and Sloane.
For more information on ‘Gosset’ see Hardin and Sloane (1993) and Hardin and Sloane
(1994).
10 discrete price 0 10 30 60
20 discrete blk 0 1
30 discrete wst 0 1
40 discrete dam1 dam2 dam3 cov1 cov2 cov3 0 1
50 range dam4 cov4 0 1
60 constraint dam1 + dam2 + dam3 + dam4 = 1
70 constraint cov1 + cov2 + cov3 + cov4 = 1
80 model
(1 + price + blk + wst + dam1 + dam2 + dam3 + dam4 + cov1 + cov2 + cov3 + cov4)^2
+ price^3 - blk^2 - wst^2 - dam1^2 - dam2^2 - dam3^2 - dam4^2
- cov1^2 - cov2^2 - cov3^2 - cov4^2
design type = D n = 50
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5.4. Complete estimation results
Table 6. Complete estimation results. Part 1/2.
Variable Coefficient S.E.
Many blackouts (blackouts) −0.26656∗∗ 0.09293
Unresolved waste disposal problems (waste) −0.67369∗∗ 0.09702
Damage in 100 bn. CHF (damage) 0.06612 0.15924
Insurance coverage in percent (coverage) 0.01416∗∗ 0.00329
Disposable income in CHF 000s (income) 2.9755∗ 1.4302
Income2 0.0228 0.0142
Damage2 −0.2320∗∗ 0.0794
Coverage2 −0.00009∗∗ 0.00003
Damage ∗ coverage 0.0342∗∗ 0.0106
Damage ∗ waste 0.1145 0.0771
Damage ∗ blackouts −0.0364 0.0718
Coverage ∗ waste 0.0012 0.0015
Coverage ∗ blackouts −0.0036∗ 0.0016
No income (= −outlay in CHF 000s) −4.0500 2.8300
No income2 (=outlay2) 0.4740 1.0200
(Pessimistic beliefs) ∗ income −1.0153 0.6523
(Pessimistic beliefs) ∗ income2 0.0051 0.0031
(Pessimistic beliefs) ∗ noincome 0.0813 0.3305
(Medium level of education) ∗ income −1.2353 1.1717
(Medium level of education) ∗ income2 −0.0239+ 0.0136
(Medium level of education) ∗ noincome −1.0342 2.1487
(Medium level of education) ∗ noincome2 −0.5970 0.7770
(High level of education) ∗ income −6.7719∗∗ 1.6609
(High level of education) ∗ income2 −0.0066 0.0146
(High level of education) ∗ noincome 1.0015 2.2493
(High level of education) ∗ noincome2 0.0724 0.7700
Age ∗ income 0.0480∗ 0.0211
Age ∗ income2 −0.0002+ 0.0001
Age ∗ noincome −0.0041 0.0382
Age ∗ noincome2 0.00000 0.0134
Female ∗ income 0.0338 0.6020
Female ∗ income2 0.0029 0.0032
Female ∗ noincome 0.4417 1.1221
Female ∗ noincome2 −0.4410 0.3820
Constant 0.22319+ 0.13173
Observations 4119
Number of individuals 375
Log likelihood −1959.67
Log likelihood constant only −2326.77
ρ 0.5425
ση 1.0890
+significant at 10%, ∗significant at 5%, ∗∗significant at 1%.
Note: Since income is equal to stated income minus outlay on electricity, noincome = −outlay.
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Notes
1. 4 · 2 · 2 · 4 · 4 = 256.
2. In fact it is almost certain that the government will step in, as recent much less severe events have shown (e.g.
the bailout of Swiss Airlines Ltd. in 2002).
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